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Plato's Phaedo
JAMES A. ARIETI
No scene which presents itself to the imagination excites greater
pathos than that of Socrates sitting on his prison couch and cheerfully
drinking his cup of poison. Long after the reader has forgotten the
wandering maze of arguments in Plato's Phaedo, he carries fixed in
his mind the heroism of Socrates during his last day, his persistence
in pursuing difficult arguments, and the nobility with which he meets
his death. And Plato has achieved his aim, for the dialogue is not
about the immortality of the soul— indeed, the arguments, as gen-
erally recognized, are unsuccessful— no, the dialogue is about the
heroic death of Socrates and the proposition that only the philoso-
pher— as epitomized in the person of Socrates— can meet death
heroically.' For only the philosopher knows that he cannot know about
the afterlife and the soul, and he is thus the only one who can die
courageously.
The Phaedo shows, perhaps more than any other dialogue, how
' Cf. Paul Friedlander {Plato, Vol. I, tr. Hans MeyerhofF [Princeton 1969], p. 122),
who says that all the Platonic dialogues are ultimately encomia to Socrates. Nietzsche
too saw the figure of Socrates as charismatic or inspirational. Hans-Georg Gadamer
{Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, tr. P. Christopher Smith
[New Haven and London 1980], p. 22) writes: "As Nietzsche has so aptly put it, this
figure of the dying Socrates became the new ideal to which the noblest of the Greek
youth now dedicated themselves instead of to that older heroic ideal, Achilles. Thus
the Phaedo's poetic power to convince is stronger than its logical power to prove."
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philosophy may be subordinated to drama in Plato. ^ Indeed, unless
one understands the arguments, and sees their weakness, he will not
^ Since Schleiermacher's insight that "Form and subject are inseparable, and no
proposition is to be rightly understood except in its own place and with the
combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it" (reprinted in Great
Thinkers on Plato, ed. Barry Gross [New York 1979], p. 71), there has been a great
deal of attention paid to drama in Plato. Friedlander, Jaeger (especially in Volume
II of Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. G. Highet, Oxford 1943), Leo Strauss
(The City and the Man, Chicago 1964), Allan Bloom (in the preface to his translation
of the Republic, New York 1968), Jacob Klein (A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Chapel
Hill 1965), and Drew Hyland ("Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric
1 [1968]) discuss the importance of the dramatical parts of the dialogue. Wilamowitz
{Platan Vol. I, Berlin 1919, p. 123) suggests that the purpose of the early dialogues
is poetic and imaginative— not profound or philosophical, in short, that their purpose
is dramatic. While I would agree with Wilamowitz that the purpose may be dramatic,
I do not agree that the purpose is not also philosophic or profound; as I hope to
show for the Phaedo each may serve the other.
In the case of the Phaedo, some, while admitting the brilliance of the drama, do
not admit its primacy. A. E. Taylor, for example {Plato: The Man and His Work, London
1926), says the dialogue shows Plato's dramatic art "at its ripe perfection" (p. 174),
but thinks the dialogue is about "the divinity of the human soul, and 'imitation of
God' as the right and reasonable mode of conduct" (p. 177). Raven {Plato's Thought
in the Making, Cambridge 1965) praises the drama in passing, but says that the
dialogue "is concerned as a whole . . . with the immortality of the soul" (p. 79).
The two who deal most with the dramatical qualities of the Phaedo are Kenneth
Dorter, ("The Dramatic Aspect of Plato's Phaedo [Dialogue 9, 1970: 564-580]) and
Gadamer {op. cit). Dorter points out, in the manner of the followers of Strauss, a
number of significant details (e.g., that 14 men were on Theseus' ship and 14 at
Socrates' execution); and while he discusses details with insight, he does not seem to
have a sense of the dramatic purpose of the whole. He argues that Socrates' purpose
is to convince his audience not to fear death (p. 574). But quite inconsistently, he
concludes that the lesson of the dialogue is that "If we wish to attain an immortality
more meaningful and personal than the objective immortality in which all temporal
things share equally, we must win it through a philosophical attempt to apprehend
and assimilate ourselves to the immutable ground of what is." Dorter points out a
number of details, and he is quite good at showing why some of the arguments are
specious, but he fails to ask the fundamental question: why does Plato allow Socrates to
use obviously specious arguments? Gadamer, having brilliantly shown that the arguments
are invalid, argues (pp. 36-37) that the point of dialogue is that science, even the
advanced science of Plato's day, cannot answer the important questions about human
life and our understanding of it. We must, he says, "think beyond the surrounding
world given to us in sense experience and beyond our finite existence." The growing
scientific insight of Plato's time "does not obviate the need for thinking beyond the
reality of the world, and it has no authority to contest religious convictions." Certainly
Gadamer is right, that the dialogue shows us that even the best scientists, i.e., the
Pythagoreans, cannot prove the immortality of the soul. But this is subordinate to
the dramatic point: that for Socrates to be courageous, he must be aware that he
does not know about the immortality of the soul; indeed, one of the reasons for the
true philosopher's courage is that he knows the limits of his knowledge, he alone
knows what he knows and does not know.
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understand the drama of the dialogue except superficially; and it is
towards the drama of Socrates' death that everything in the dialogue
points.^ But seeing the weakness of the arguments is important only
if one asks and then understands why the arguments are weak, and
why their weakness is essential if Socrates is to behave heroically, and
why, moreover, he is most heroic when his arguments are weakest.
Some of the master's arguments are refuted by the interlocutors,
some by the dramatic situation."* Socrates' initial statement was
twofold: that the philosopher welcomes death (61c) and that we ought
not to commit suicide because we are the property of the gods (62b).
' The dramatic purpose of the dialogue is therefore to inspire by a means other
than discursive reasoning. To be sure, one must see the faults in the arguments to
be so moved. As Jaeger (p. 36) put it: "We feel Socrates' intellectual power by
dramatically showing its more than intellectual effect on men" and again (p. 90),
"Plato had often felt Socrates' power to guide men's souls. He must have known
that as an author his own greatest and hardest task in recreating Socrates' teaching
was to make his readers feel the same influence he had once felt himself." Aristotle
had, of course, recognized the literary and mimetic quality of the dialogues, so much
so that he had called them poetry {Poetics 1447bl 1). Cf. Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method
of Dialectic, tr. D.J. Allan (Oxford 1940), p. 2. Indeed, Longinus, On the Sublime (13),
maintains that Plato competed with Homer in poetic mimesis— surely for an effect
that was emotional. •
^ I shall present here the merest outline of the arguments, just enough to show
where the arguments fail. That the arguments are unsound has been noted by most
scholars (see below), despite a few ingenious attempts to rescue them (on these also
see below). Here I wish merely to enable the reader to recollect the arguments and
their failings. What 1 wish to do is show why the arguments must be weak for the
dialogue to achieve its dramatic purpose, and why their intentional weakness is the
dialogue's beauty and strength. Of course, that the arguments inust be weak is also
one of the points of the dialogue, for it is not possible in this life to form absolute
proofs for the immortality of the soul.
The proofs are objected to generally by Friedlander (Vol. Ill, p. 36), who observes
that they do not reach their goal; by A. E. Taylor (op. cit., p. 103), who says: "In
point of fact, the first two proofs are found to break down and the third, as Burnet
observes, is said by Socrates (107b6) to need clear explanation. Thus it is plain that
Plato did not mean to present the arguments as absolutely probative to his own
mind." Raven acknowledges the difficulties though he will not discuss them (p. 103).
J. H. Randall, Jr. {Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, New York 1970, p. 215)
declares: "The arguments are not to be taken literally: they are all myths and
parables." Norman GuUey {Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1962) discusses
difficulties with the arguments (pp. 32-33) and various inconsistencies (p. 47).
Hackforth {Plato's Phaedo, New York 1955, p. 19), Klein (pp. 26, 108, 126), and J.
B. Skemp {The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues, Cambridge 1942, p. 7) all
point out that Socrates hints at the inadequacy of his own proofs. Gadamer (p. 22)
sums it up well: "The proofs of the immortality of the soul which follow one another
in this discussion all have something deeply dissatisfying about them. . . . The argu-
ments themselves are unconvincing, however much the human presence of Socrates
is convincing."
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Cebes correctly perceives that if the second part of Socrates' statement
is true, then the first cannot be: a wise man would not be glad to
leave masters so good and wise as the gods. Socrates' first argument
on the immortality of the soul, the principle of generation from
opposites, is equivocal and faulty right at the beginning, as Socrates
shifts from all things which are born (70d) to things which have an
opposite (70e)— surely a great reduction from many things to just a
few.^ This argument is not refuted by the interlocutors, but Cebes
brings an abrupt end to the discussion and urges Socrates to move
on to another proof— that based on the theory of recollection.^ This
theory is not refuted by any dialectical exchange; it is, however,
effectively refuted by the dramatic elements of the dialogue: joke
after joke reminds us that nobody can, even after it is explained,
recall the doctrine of recollection.' First Simmias begs to have it told
to him (73a); later, after Socrates has explained the entire theory
again, Simmias laments that when Socrates is dead, on the next day,
nobody will be left who can explain the theory: in other words, it
will have been forgotten (78a). The theory is, in addition, inadequate
because, as Simmias observes (77a-b), even if it were valid, it would
explain the existence of the soul only before birth, not after death.
^
Socrates' third argument maintains that the soul lives free of the
body in the realm of ideas and cannot be destroyed with the body
because of its aloofness from things physical (and the death of the
physical cannot be at the same time the death of the non-physical).
The argument depends on the soul's having little or no communion
with the body (80d) even during life. But Socrates himself does not
seem convinced by his own argument, for if the soul were not
^ The argument equivocates by failing to distinguish properly between absolute
and relative terms (cf. Friedlander, Vol. Ill, p. 45).
^ Objecting to the theory of recollection {anamnesis) is virtually a cottage industry
among Plato scholars. On difficulties with the argument here see K. W. Mills' two
articles, "Plato's Phaedo 74b7-c6," Phronesis 2 (1957), 128-147 and 3 (1958), 40-58;
J. M. Rist, "Equals and Intermediates in Plato," Phronesis 9 (1964), 27-37; Dorothy
Tarrant, "Plato, Phaedo lAa^-hy Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 125; Kenneth
Dorter, "Equality, Recollection, and Purification," Phronesis 17 (1972), 198-218; and
Gadamer, pp. 26 if. The account of recollection is, according to these scholars,
incomplete and inadequate, and even Tarrant's variant reading won't save it. For a
summary of the inconsistencies and a citation of more literature, see Richard J.
Ketchum, "Knowledge and Recollection in the Phaedo: An Interpretation of 74a-75b,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979), 243.
' On a similar joke on memory, see Meno 7lc and the discussion of the joke in
William S. Cobb, Jr., "Anamnesis: Platonic Doctrine or Sophistic Absurdity?" Dialogue
12 (1973), 604-28.
^ And, of course, the theory of recollection is mired in the problem of infinite
regress (i.e., whence the original knowledge?). See Cobb, esp. pp. 619-21.
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connected to the body in some way, why should the body be a prison
to it?^ And he seems to deny the non-physical nature of the soul as
he draws his argument to a close. He says, "Because each pleasure
and pain like a nail nails the soul to the body and affixes it and makes
it bodily . . ." (83d). '° If, then, a pleasure and pain can affect the soul,
why not death? That Socrates' principal interlocutors are dissatisfied
with the arguments— as they should be— is made abundantly clear
when Simmias and Cebes, whispering to one another, are interrupted
by Socrates, who says (84c): "Indeed, there are a good many doubts
and objections, if one cares to go through the argument with adequate
thoroughness." Simmias, thus prodded, agrees (85d): "You see, Soc-
rates, when I reflect on what has been said by me and Cebes here,
it does not appear quite adequate."
Socrates, after several important speeches to be considered shortly,
takes up Simmias' argument that the soul is an attunement and Cebes'
argument that the soul, like the last overcoat of a tailor, may outlive
its wearer. Socrates' refutation of Simmias depends on earlier argu-
ments, for the refutation rests on the soul's existence before the
body's; that is, the soul cannot be like an attunement because the
soul existed before the body, but the attunement did not exist before
the harp. But, of course, this argument depends on arguments which
were found unsatisfactory by Simmias and Cebes (in the passage
referred to above, where Simmias says the previous arguments have
been unsatisfactory)." If the previous arguments, which sought to
prove that the soul existed before the body, were inadequate, then
this refutation, which depends on those earlier arguments, must be
similarly inadequate. Socrates' refutation of Cebes' argument depends
on the proposition that souls, which by definition contain life, cannot
receive the opposite of life and remain souls: they must withdraw
before death and fly elsewhere.'^ Socrates draws an analogy with
^ See Burnet, Taylor, ad be. See also T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto
and Buffalo 1970), pp. 21-22; also Gadamer, pp. 27-29.
'" Translations of passages from the Phaedo are the author's. Others are as cited
in the text.
'
' For a severe criticism of the arguments on attunement, with a lucid explication
of its illogicality, see W. F. Hicken, ''Phaedo 92al l-94b3," Classical Quarterly 48 (1954),
16-22.
'^ The fallacies are subtle, but have not escaped the commentators. For a very
good discussion of how at the beginning of the argument aQ6a>aT0c, is the opposite of
Bavaroc,, but at the end it is the opposite of dvriToq, see David Keyt, "The Fallacies in
Phaedo 102a- 107b," Phronesis 8 (1963), 170 ff. The view is also that of T L.
Landmann, "Tendenz und Gedankengang des platonischen Dialogs 'Phaedo'," Gym-
nasialprogramm (Konigsberg in Pr., 1 87 1), p. 8 and of G. Schneider, Die Weltanschauung
Platos dargestellt in Anschlusse an den Dialog Phaedon (Berlin 1898), pp. 106-108. T.
134 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
snow: when snow receives fire it will not remain snow, but it will
either retreat or be destroyed. Snow is, however, destroyed by fire
and does not, even if it is made into a snowman, get up on its legs
and run away. The argument is seductive, but is rather silly when
studied carefully.'^ And though Socrates' interlocutors seem to agree,
they do admit to doubts.'"* Simmias, at the end of the dialogue's
dialectical portions, when Socrates has completed his "refutation" of
Cebes, says (107a-b):
I myself do not find anything to disbelieve in what has been said. But
the arguments are about a great subject, and I do distrust human frailty,
and I am still compelled to feel doubt in my own mind about what we have
said.
After approving of Simmias' skepticism, Socrates launches into his
myth on the habitations of the soul after death and the description
of the earth. As various commentators on Plato have observed,
Socrates tells a myth when the arguments have gone about as far as
they can; where logical reasoning and certainty end, speculation in
the form of myth begins.'^
Elsewhere, when Socrates discusses the nature of the soul, he also
brings in myth, and the very act of telling the myth seems to be for
M. Robinson (pp. 27-29), having discussed the difficulties, concludes that "one
interpretation introduces as many anomalies as it is meant to solve." D. O'Brien, in
two long articles ("The Last Argument of Plato's Phaedo I and II," Classical Quarterly
17 [1967], 198-231 and 18 [1968], 95-106), while finding fault with the argument
sees some use in it for the historian of philosophy, since he says it anticipates Anselm's
ontological argument for the existence of God. See also Hackforth (p. 164), who
says that "from the standpoint of logic, the argument has petered out into futility";
I. A. Crombie {An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. II, London 1962), who calls
the argument "a nest of confusions" (p. 169) and says the conclusion follows "if we
do not look too closely" (p. 164); and J. B. Skemp (p. 8), who describes the final
proof as "a blatant petitio principii"; also Gadamer (pp. 34-36).
" The argument, however, is not without some defenders. Dorothea Frede, "The
Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo 102a- 107a," Phronesis
23 (1978), 27-41, thinks that Socrates is certain about the last argument. But Gregory
Vlastos ("Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo" [Modern Studies in Philosophy: Plato: I.
Metaphysics and Epistemology. A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City 1971]), while
defending what he sees to be the most important argument (that which takes place
in 95e-105e), admits that it is not "entirely clear or wholly true" (p. 133).
'^ Cf. Gadamer, p. 36: "As convincing as the discussion might have been, the
conclusion is drawn that the proofs are not sufficient and that one must continue to
test their premises insofar as is humanly possible. Evidently in questions of this sort
one cannot expect greater certainty." See also Stenzel, p. 8.
''' Cf., for example, Friedlander, Vol. I, pp. 189-90; J. A. Stewart, The Myths of
Plato (London and New York 1905), pp. 24-102 passim; S. Rosen, The Symposium of
Plato (New Haven and London 1968), pp. 207-11; W.Jaeger, pp. 151-52.
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him an admission that scientific knowledge is impossible. Hence it is
necessary to give a similitude, a metaphorical and speculative account
of the nature of the unknowable. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates is
delivering his "serious" speech on the nature of love, he says
concerning the soul:
What the nature of the soul is would be a long tale to tell, and most
assuredly only a god alone could tell it, but what it resembles, that a man
might tell in briefer compass (246a).
A bit later he extends our imprecision to the "immortal": " 'immortal'
is a term applied on the basis of no reasoned argument at all, but
our fancy (wXaTrofiev) pictures the god whom we have never seen,
nor fully conceived, as an immortal living being" (246c) [tr. R.
Hackforth]. Or, as Timaeus explains to Socrates when he is about to
tell his myth concerning the generation of the gods and the cosmos
(Timaeus 29c-d):
If then, Socrates, amidst the many opinions about the gods [the
immortals] and the generation of the universe, we are not able to
give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and
consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough if we adduce
probabilities as likely as any others, for we must remember that I who
am the speaker and you who are the judges are only mortal men, and
we would do well to accept the tale which is probable and inquire no
further [tr. B. Jowett].
For Plato and Socrates, then, the realm of the divine was not
absolutely knowable by mortal men. The soul's immortality, which
caused it to be most like to the divine (Phaedo 80b), also prevented
it from being understood by human reason (logos). '^ Socrates' very
making of a myth, then, shows that he himself does not believe the
soul's immortality a matter which can be proven. This is not to say,
of course, that the myth has no value. As Friedlander and others
have argued, the real value of the myth lies in moving the soul
towards virtue by a means which bypasses discursive reasoning and
affects the soul directly, a means we may call, in a non-Platonic
context, "inspiration."'' And this is clearly a chief purpose of the
myth here, as Socrates discusses in the context of the soul's future
"^ On the equivalence of immortality and divinity, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History
of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV (Cambridge 1975), p. 330. Cf. Rosen {op. cit.): "The
Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Timaeus all teach us that it is impossible to grasp the immmortal
and divine by means of logos" (p. 209).
'^ Inspiration may be the way art in general functions: it does not work by shaping
the reason in men, but works instead by a direct grasp on the soul. Thus poets,
seers, and prophets operate by inspiration and deliver their messages without knowing
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habitations the need to make sure that the soul is pure and virtuous
in this world (107 fF.).
Thus the arguments, by their failure, and the myths, by their very
presence, point to the impossibility— at least in our mortal state—
of knowing about the afterlife. Indeed, time after time, repeated
through the dialogue is the insistence that we cannot know for sure.
Thus Socrates begins the dialogue (63b-c):
I will try to be more persuasive to you than I was to my judges. If I
did not believe, Simmias and Cebes, that I should pass over first to
other gods, both wise and good ... I should be wrong not objecting
to death; but know well that I hope I shall enter the company of good
men, even though I would not affirm it confidently; but that I shall
come to gods who are very good masters, know well that if I would
affirm confidently anything else, I would affirm this.
Later (85c), Simmias, voicing his objections to some of Socrates'
arguments, says:
For it seems to me, as perhaps also to you, Socrates, that to know
clearly about such matters in this present life is impossible, or at least
extremely difficult.
And at the end of the dialogue, when Socrates has described his
vision of the afterlife, he concludes (1 14d):
It is not fitting for a sensible man to affirm confidently that such
things are just as I have described; but that this or something of this
sort is what happens to our souls and their abodes, and since the soul
is clearly immortal, that this is so seems proper and worth the risk of
believing; for the risk is noble.
The dialectic on the immortality of the soul confirms these state-
ments that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible. If
the arguments prove anything, it is this. But not all men, of course,
know that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible.
Indeed, some believe certain legends (70c) that there is an afterlife,
just as others believe (70a) that when a man dies the soul leaves the
body and goes out like a breath or whiff of smoke; the many, however,
do not understand and do not think about these matters. That is
why, says Socrates (64b), the many do not understand the sense in
which the philosopher wants to die. The many think they know
what they mean {^Apology 22c). Statesmen, too, because of the absence of teachers,
cannot have been taught virtue and must have received it by a divine inspiration
{Meno 99d). Cf. also Laws 682a, 719c. And as Friedlander observes {op. cit., Vol. I, p.
190), Socrates in the Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic often speaks of the purpose of
myths as inspiration to virtuous conduct.
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whether there is or is not an afterlife. But— at least if he has been
through the conversation of the Phaedo— the philosopher knows that
he does not know about the future habitations and state of the soul.
It is for this reason— that the philosopher alone knows that he
does not know the future condition of his soul— that the philosopher
is the only one who can die courageously.'^ An earlier dialogue, the
Laches, had grappled with the question of courage. That dialogue
appeared to be aporetic, for there courage was shown to be a kind
of knowledge, like the other virtues.'^ But if courage were knowledge
of the outcome, what bravery would be involved in the action? For
example, if a fully equipped army were going against one armed only
with toothpicks, the powerful army would have knowledge that it
would be victorious: no courage would therefore be involved; and
the weak army would have knowledge it was going to lose; and it
would therefore be rash, not courageous, in joining battle. But the
Laches did contain the clue to courage: it is knowledge of your
ignorance of the outcome, with a willingness to persevere. Only the
man who knows that he does not know the outcome will go into
battle courageously; and the philosopher will be the most courageous
of men— for he, like Socrates, is most aware that he does not know
the outcome.
Here lies, I think, the true meaning of the weak nature of the
arguments in the Phaedo. The dialogue is not, of course, about the
immortality of the soul; it is about the death of Socrates. It is about
the very things Echecrates inquired of Phaedo (57a): "What was it
the man said before his death? And how did he die?" The dialogue
is about the courageous way in which Socrates died; if one does not
see how and why the arguments fail to provide certain knowledge of
the soul, one cannot see the courage in facing death and Socrates'
heroism.
Socrates' courage is brilliant. When Cebes objects to his arguments
concerning suicide, Socrates is pleased (63a). And yet why should
Socrates be pleased? Socrates' argument that suicide is wrong rested
on the assumption that we have good masters here on earth and that
we should not violate their proprietary rights by killing ourselves,
'^ Socrates says too {Phaedo 68c) that only the philosopher is courageous in the
right way.
'^ In the Laches it is suggested that courage is an endurance of the soul; the
dialogue seemed aporetic because it seemed that courage could be neither knowledge
nor ignorance. My suggestion is in keeping with Socrates' position throughout the
dialogues: knowledge of ignorance is a kind of knowledge; courage is a special kind
of ignorance— ignorance of the outcome; it is also an endurance of the soul in
seeking the outcome.
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who are their property; but if our masters are so good, Cebes has
asked, why should the philosopher be glad to leave them? It was
necessary for Socrates' argument to be sound so that Socrates could
face death with confidence: Socrates should not therefore be pleased
that his argument was defeated. Yet he is pleased; and his pleasure
is heroic: it places in jeopardy his equanimity, but the promise of an
argument holds the prize of truth before him.
Crito warns Socrates that, if he talks, he may have to take extra
doses of poison. Socrates is impatient with such matters, and disdaining
Crito's concern declares (63e): "Oh, let the jailer be; let him do his
job and be ready to give me two portions, even three." After the
arguments on recollection, Socrates consoles his friends: yes, there
will surely be someone in Hellas, large as it is, who will help them
overcome their fear of death (78a).
But nowhere is Socrates more heroic than in the great central
portion of the dialogue, when Simmias and Cebes express their
penetrating objections to his theories. First, he must force them to
express their objections. Socrates is himself aware that the argument
may be weak (84c):
Indeed, there are a good many doubts and objections, if one cares to
go through the argument with adequate thoroughness.
Simmias affirms that he and Cebes are unsure of the arguments but
are reluctant to trouble Socrates in case he is distressed by the
approaching execution. As before, when Cebes objected to this theory
on suicide, Socrates displays good humor. Socrates laughs and launches
into his famous comparison of himself and a swan, the bird sacred
to Apollo (84e-85b). Again, as in virtually all the dialogues, Socrates
distinguishes himself from the many, who do not understand; in this
case what they do not understand is the nature of the swan's song.
Socrates' position is dangerous by any standards: he is urging his
interlocutors to come forward with the strongest possible objections
to his arguments. The greatest possible courage will be necessary to
confront them.
At this point (88c) the outer dialogue, the framing narrative, is
interrupted as Phaedo tells Echecrates that those present, while they
had been convinced by earlier arguments, were now beginning to
doubt the whole business. Echecrates asks Phaedo many questions
about both the discussion and Socrates' demeanor. Phaedo answers
that Socrates was never more wondrous than then. Philosophy, we
remember from the Theaetetus, begins in wonder; and surely philos-
ophy is provoked by the wondrous majesty of Socrates on the day of
his execution.
I
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Phaedo compares Socrates to Heracles with the advantage going
to Socrates, for Socrates will have to contest alone with two oppo-
nents— Simmias and Cebes— while Heracles had the aid of lolaus
in fighting the Hydra (89c). Socrates, with ironic modesty, jokes that
he is merely lolaus, but Phaedo corrects him. The comparison to the
mightiest Greek hero— with Socrates clearly named as the superior
(for he will fight single-handedly with two where Heracles fought
with only one)— shows that the others present also recognize that
Socrates is a hero.
No part of the dialogue shows Socrates more a teacher of philo-
sophic courage than the speech he launches into on "misology"—
the hating of argument (logos) (89d ff.). Repeated dead-ends in
argument may lead, Socrates warns, to a hating of arguments in
general; but a philosopher must stick to his post. The difficulty in
avoiding misology comes from having to engage in arguments to gain
the truth, but until the truth is gained the outcome is uncertain: one
cannot know the end of the argument— whether it will be a dead-
end or a live birth of an idea— until the argument is over. But if,
because of difficulties, the philosopher does persist in the argument
but comes to hate logos, he will certainly never get at the truth; to
persist in the argument requires courage: courage, the knowledge
that he does not know the outcome, but the persistence to endure.
The passage on misology is, really, more important than the arguments
on immortality insofar as it presents the doctrine of philosophical
courage while the arguments merely show that courage in force.
Socrates is himself providing the model of argument, for he is a lover
of logos; and despite the aporetic nature of his arguments, he dies
sticking to his philosophic post, pursuing the truth to the end.^° And
later, when he has taken up Cebes' argument, Socrates will heroically
exclaim: "Let us go attack like Homeric heroes, and see what strength
there is in what you say" (95b).
The arguments over, Socrates, nobly risking belief in the happy
futurity of his soul, cheerfully drinks the hemlock, and in that simple
action does his civic duty with the same courage we observed in
argument. How can Socrates face death with such calm, indeed with
^^ This courage was characteristic of Socrates in his youth, too. The exercise of
this youthful courage is the focus of the autobiographical passage: when Socrates
saw the difficulties in the positions of the various philosophers and especially of
Anaxagoras, whose positions were the most promising, far from becoming a misologue,
he began his independent search for wisdom. In a similarly heroic passage, Socrates
says in the Meno (86b) that it is far more courageous to find out what is not known
than to say that, since it is impossible to learn the truth, there is no need to try.
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such cheer? Why should knowing his ignorance enable him to be so
serene?
Socrates' knowledge of his ignorance is what has given him phil-
osophic life. Ever since Chaerephon told him of the Delphic oracle
that there was no man wiser than he {Apology 21a), Socrates' mission
has been to test the truth of the pronouncement. His life has been
spent going from one person who believed himself wise to another
and demonstrating to each that though he thought he was wise he
was not really so. Socrates found that he was wiser than the others,
for he alone knew that he did not know. Politicians claimed to know
about statecraft but did not really know; poets claimed to know about
poetry but did not understand their own poems. But Socrates at least
knew that he did not know— here lay his superior wisdom {Apology
21b-23b). In this sense he is true to his life's mission even here in
the Phaedo. He has spoken with students of philosophy, with followers
of Pythagoras (Simmias and Cebes), and we must not forget that it
was the Pythagoreans who claimed to know about the immortality of
the soul. And again he has done as always: he has shown those who
might presume to know that they did not know. In this sense the
dialogue is true to the form of the aporetic dialogues— those which
searched for but failed to discover the truth.
But in a larger and profounder sense, it was this knowledge of
ignorance which enabled Socrates to be a philosopher at all. For a
philosopher, we know from the Symposium, is imbued with philosophic
epoic,. That is, he is an intermediary between knowledge and ignorance.
As Diotima tells Socrates {Symposium 203e f.):
Love stands midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must un-
derstand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not
long for wisdom, because they are wise—and why should the wise be
seeking wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the
ignorant seek the truth or yearn to be made wise. [tr. M. Joyce]
Only the man aware of his own ignorance, the one pulled by love
towards wisdom, can be a philosopher. Socrates, knowing that he is
to die, believes that he will soon find this wisdom which he has been
seeking, if it is to be found. For this wisdom is not to be found in
mortal life. The truth about the immortality of the soul cannot be
discovered by argument: it must be discovered experientially. His
eagerness to learn and the possibility of learning the truth account
for his cheer.
And finally, Socratic ignorance is, of course, not absolute ignorance.
It is ignorance mingled with knowledge. The man courageous in
battle perseveres despite knowing that he is ignorant of the outcome—
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whether he will win or lose. But in another sense he knows the
alternatives and faces them nevertheless. Either he will be victorious
or he will die honorably— alternatives both noble. Socrates, as he
has said in the Apology (40c-d), also knows the alternatives: either he
will enjoy a dreamless sleep or he will go to that happy realm to
which his virtue and philosophy have entitled him. He knows the
alternatives and he knows his ignorance, an ignorance he had men-
tioned with great clarity in the Apology (29a-b):
For let me tell you, gentlemen, that to be afraid of death is only
another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not; it is to
think that one knows what one does not know. No one knows with-
regard to death whether it is not really the greatest blessing that can
happen to a man, but people dread it as though they were certain
that it is the greatest evil, and this ignorance, which thinks that it
knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance most culpable. This
I take it, gentlemen, is the degree, and this is the nature of my
advantage over the rest of mankind, and if I were to claim to be wiser
than my neighbor in any respect, it would be in this— that not
possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also
conscious that I do not possess it. [tr. Hugh Tredennick]
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates' friends weep at his fate.
Perhaps, had they been convinced by the arguments for the immor-
tality of the soul, they would bear calmly the master's death. Their
weeping seems to be a dramatic corroboration of their lack of
conviction that the arguments of the present conversation, at least,
have been airtight. It may be suggested, however, that there remains
a possibility at a later time of finding such a proof. Such a possibility
would not affect the drama of the moment: Socrates has done his
very best, but as so often in his life, the truth has eluded him and
again he has discovered that he does not know. Have the interlocutors
learned that they cannot know about the soul's immortality? Simmias
had spoken earlier (85c) about the impossibility or at least extreme
difficulty of such knowledge. Perhaps here at the end the weeping
of Socrates' friends is an acknowledgment that without Socrates they
may not be able to escape perplexity (aTropia) on this matter; or
perhaps it suggests that they are not up to Socrates' high standards,
that despite their wish to please the master, their courage is not so
great as his. This weakness was alluded to earlier, when Cebes admitted
that there was in him "a little boy who has a childish" fear of death
(77e) in need of a Socratic charm to purge the fear. Perhaps only the
master has so developed the man in his soul as to possess the courage
necessary to face the uncertainty in death. The friends' lack of
composure in the face of Socrates' calm perhaps shows that Socrates
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is the only true philosopher and shows too how lonely a condition
that is.
In the Crito Socrates had told of his dream in which a woman
came to him and said that on the third day he would be home in
Phthia (44b). The line, from Book IX of the Iliad (363), was originally
spoken by Achilles to the embassy, when Achilles declared to Odysseus
that he was leaving Troy the next day and would arrive home on
the third. That line could not help but contrast the situation of the
two men. Achilles had voluntarily left battle; his departure for home
would leave the Greeks in a state of perplexity concerning the conduct
of the war; indeed, his prayer would be fulfilled and there would be
nothing between the Greeks and destruction. Socrates, though con-
demned by his own people, did not flee Athens; but his departure
from life would similarly leave his people in great perplexity. The
failure to come to a conclusion in the dialogue made that perplexity,
that airopia, all the more apparent. When Socrates left his prison
house of Athens, the city's soul was departing, leaving for its eternal
home.
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